Nov 27, 2014 | Branding, Category, Change, Marketing, retail, Small business
A short while ago, I posted “10 strategies for SME’s to beat the supermarket gorillas at their own game” which generated quite a bit of comment and feedback. Amongst the feedback were a number of requests to go into more detail on each of the strategies, and so this is the first of the series, focussed on understanding the business model of the supermarkets.
I deliberately used the word “Gorillas” because of the extraordinarily concentrated nature of Australia’s supermarket retailers, with Coles and Woolworths between them holding over 70% of FMCG sales depending on the category, and whose numbers you believe.
You know the old question: “where do the 500kg gorillas sleep?”
Answer: “anywhere they bloody like”
That was the way it was, a comfy duopoly, however, more recently there have been some major strategy alterations by Coles which has dramatically lifted their financial performance, and Aldi has successfully carved out a growing niche as a third retail presence. In addition, there are still some very good independent retailers around operating out of the wholesaler Metcash, who also competes with some of their own and franchised retail outlets.
This mix, combined with the opportunities suppliers have to sell into food service and institutional markets and increasingly direct to consumers via the net and other means makes for an environment where the agile and insightful suppliers can be very successful despite the obstacles, but it is a very challenging environment.
The concept of business models is well known, in summary, it is the expression of how a business makes money. It always involves a matrix of revenue generated, the fixed and variable costs of generating that revenue, and the choices that the business makes about its customers and how they will be serviced, and the way they incur the costs of that servicing.
Supermarkets are a great example of a number of seemingly similar competitors that have slightly differing business models. At a macro level they have strong similarities, relying on volume, price, and shopper numbers to succeed, but everyone who shops knows that Woolworths is not Coles, is not Aldi.
However, they do have some common building blocks.
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- Revenue generation. Supermarkets generate revenue on both sides of the equation.
- Shoppers buy products, paying at the checkout.
- Suppliers “pay” for shelf space via a range of charges levied for every variable the retailers can dream up. Volume discounts, payment terms, promotional levies, preferred shelf positioning, promotional slots, access to sales information, and a host of others. Some are items for which suppliers receive an invoice, others are taken as discounts off the invoice price, increasingly applied automatically as a part of the trading term package.
- Cost management. Supermarkets work on very low percentage margins, relying on the volume to generate the cash margins.
- Fixed costs are a significant part of retailers total costs, made up of the provision of the retail floor space, the logistics infrastructure and personnel. Supermarkets attack their fixed cost base aggressively using their scale as negotiation tools with landlords and logistics suppliers, while keeping a very substantial proportion of front line retail staff as casuals rather than permanent employees so they can better adjust staff levels to match activity. The sorts of choices retailers make are between high density shopping centre locations Vs stand alone locations. There are costs and benefits to each which are considered as a part of their strategic decision making.
- The biggest variable cost is the cost of good sold, and they similarly use their scale to manage those costs downward. Tactics vary between retailers, but the core game is to maximise their margins while keeping prices as low as possible to attract the volume buyers. This is an extremely delicate balance.
- Transaction costs are usually pretty well hidden in most businesses, but are really significant in the case of supermarkets simply due to the number of transactions they make. For example, there is a cost to managing the buying relationship with a supplier, but the larger the supplier, the less is the total costs/unit of sale of managing that relationship. This has led to a dramatic reduction of the number of suppliers supermarkets have in any category over the last 15 years or so a trend further accelerated by the increasingly common strategy of limiting the number of proprietary brands in any category substituting house-branded products, and reducing the number of relationships to be managed. This has made negotiating shelf space increasingly hard, and because of scarcity, increasingly expensive for suppliers, in turn putting extreme pressure on small suppliers.
- Customer service and relationships. The retailers have each made choices about the pricing, location, ranging, and service strategies that sets them apart from each other, and more subtly, they have back office strategies that differ. However, their common aim is to have as much market share ass possible, as volume is the profit generator.
- As in any market, no retailer can be all things to all people, so each makes the choice of the “ideal” customer, and markets towards them, grateful for any overlap. Increasingly the marketing is being supported by customer loyalty cards and the data mining and personalised promotional opportunities that technology is delivering, but the fundamental measures of success remain unchanged: number of shoppers, share of wallet, and basket size.
- The two major retailers have very large marketing budgets which they spend in a wide variety of ways, across all channels of communication with customers and potential customers, and often in joint activity with their suppliers, which inevitably, the suppliers end up funding in return for volume. The smaller the retailer, the less “mass market” they are, so the tactics tend to differ, although strategically, finding willing supplier partners is a core part of every retailers marketing mix.
- Consumers generally want choice when they are in a supermarket, the more the better, in any category. Woolworths and Coles stores carry 12-20,000 Sku’s (Stock keeping unit) depending on the size and location of the store, a typical IGA might carry 8-10,000, while Aldi carry just over 1,000. The sku’s carried in any store also reflect of the demographic and cultural mix. The Woolworths store in Auburn in Sydney has a significantly different product mix to the Woolworths of a similar size in Double Bay.
- Every retailer uses some form of category management disciplines as a means to monitor, adjust and locate their inventory onto the sales face in the way that best meets their customers needs and maximises impulse pick-up. This is always a data intensive mix of the volume and margin of the individual Sku, (such as Ski strawberry yoghurt 200gm) group of similar Sku’s (all strawberry 200gm yoghurt) subcategory (all strawberry yoghurt) and category (all yoghurt) and between categories. They make choices about how many brands and types to keep in stock, where they put them, on shelf and in relation to other yogurts, and indeed other chilled products. A facing of yoghurt added is a facing of some other product gone, as the sides of the stores are not elastic. At the core of the category management activities is the need to best satisfy consumers, whilst competing effectively and delivering maximised margins.
Being agile, persistent, and prepared to experiment are about the best qualities a supplier to supermarkets can have.
Apr 24, 2014 | Branding, Category, Customers, Marketing, retail
Businesses spend many millions trying to understand the way consumers consider the choices confronting them in a supermarket. With up to 30,000 items on shelf, and some categories having hundreds of choices, it is a key consideration.
A mix of psychology, data science, habitual behaviour, discretionary spending dollars available, and individual preferences all play a role.
A complicated mix.
However, there is a way to at least clarify part of the mix.
Consumers use decision trees, usually without thinking about them when they are in a supermarket making their purchases.
Some purchases are automatic, a habitual choice, others are made after a considered set of choices on a range of factors important to the individual are made, and there are, obviously, many shades of this continuum that apply to a highly personal process.
Imagine a consumer approaching the dairy case looking for fruited yoghurt. Some may just buy their usual brand, flavour and size irrespective of everything else. Others will make a series of choices that will vary for every person, and may look something like the decision tree below.
It will differ for each individual, some will choose the brand first, others the flavour, or the size and price, and a whole range of variations on these factors, but based on the total sales, supermarkets will range products, and give them shelf positions and space based on sales, gross margins, delivered margins, and various promotional strategies. They also use a decision tree.
Retailers and suppliers spend huge amounts of effort, and resources. on this category management exercise, trying to read the consumers mind, and anticipate their reactions to various combinations that are available to them.
It is a data intensive exercise, well suited to the “big data” techniques that are evolving around us. Combining checkout data with store loyalty cards is now becoming commonplace, what is emerging currently is the integration of mobile and social media data into the mix.
As you walk into the store to buy something, there has already been lots of effort gone into reading your mind, and there will be lots of effort and money expended in store in an effort to manage your purchase decisions.
Nov 12, 2013 | Category, Change, Governance, Leadership, Strategy
Years ago there was a line in the film “Breaker Morant” where the breaker, played by Bryan Brown said of a young ladies virtue “another slice off a cut loaf will not be missed” .
I never forgot the line, and have used it often, usually to make the point that a collection of small, and in themselves insignificant changes all added up eventually make a big difference. Just like a loaf, one slice may not be missed, but lose some more, and soon enough you have no loaf left.
The treasurer approved the takeover of Warnambool Cheese and Butter (WCB) earlier today by the Canadian group Saputo, should the current take-over squabble turn out in their favour
The original Saputo offer of $7.00/share has now been upped to a current $8.00 with current share price well north, there is anticipation of further action by Bega Murray Golbourn, or Fonterra.
It is now inevitable that WCB will cease to be an independent dairy processor, it just remains to be determined if it will be owned domestically or by an international entity.
The WCB directors have done a pretty good job by their shareholders, their shares are now trading at 8.50, after being stuck around $4 for a considerable period up till July, after some pretty crap results. This is despite being a strategic supplier in an industry with demand growing strongly, particularly in Asia.
There is a bit to go, but WCB is as good as no more. Now to the offer of ADM for Graincorp, a decision slated for December 17, and feted as the more important of the two decisions due to the competitive stranglehold Graincorp has on grain handling infrastructure in the eastern states. If nothing else, the pathetic blustering of Warren Truss , and acerbic one-liners from Barnaby Joyce will be worth waiting for.
The real concern however, is the long term impact of having major food producing industries controlled overseas. Without being in the least bit xenophobic, and recognising that Australia simply does not generate enough capital to fund all the demand for capital in the economy, it cannot be healthy for the prospects of our grandchildren to be so beholden to the overseas boardrooms who control the food supply chains.
Stop the presses:
Murray Goulburn has made a further offer for WCB on Thursday 14th of $9/share, a substantial premium over the current Saputo $8/share offer, and over the closing price of $8.50 on the exchange. This is pretty heady stuff for a business that has consistently failed to deliver adequate returns to shareholders for some years, and it is hard to see how Saputo can go much further without the rationalisation benefits that MG would have.
Stop the presses, again!
It is Sunday 17th, not a day of rest in the dairy industry. Murray Goulburn has indicated that they will beat the latest Saputo offer, price to be announced, but they have the hurdle of competition policy to jump, stupid as that is in these circumstances. So, the deliriously happy WCB shareholders have the choice of taking the unconditional Saputo offer now, or waiting a bit to see what MG has in store. Meanwhile, Bega have upped their bid, but it is below the Saputo bid, so is essentially irrelevant. However, what is not irrelevant is the Bega shareholding in WCB, which along with that of MG and Fonterra add up to around 40% of WCB.
Whatever happens to WCB this coming week, Bega will come into play as soon as the dust has settled, perhaps sooner, as it is one of the very few Australian dairy assets left bigger than a paddock with a few cows and a bathtub.
Oct 17, 2013 | Branding, Category, Customers, Innovation, Marketing
Cottage cheese is a pretty dull category in supermarkets. A relatively tasteless, low calorie (therefore it must taste crappy, right?), price competitive, group of products.
Yes, so we thought.
Years ago, 25 years in fact, I was the GM Marketing of a major Australian diary company with the leading brand of Cottage cheese. I thought all of the above, and we struggled to make any return, let alone one that was a competitive use of the capital tied up.
We had very good data, for the time, remembering this is pre-internet. We knew who sold our, and competitive brands in what quantities, and pretty much to whom, as we had good U&A (usage and attitude) data. As a result we were able to segment the market pretty well by usage, demographics, geography, and basket. However, whatever we did, we had trouble moving the sales needle.
Almost as a last resort, we ran a small recipe competition on the side of the packs, easy, low cost, a prize draw of a holiday at a health resort on the Gold Coast. We got a few hundred entries, a failure by our pre-agreed metrics, so we thought we knew something else that did not work. However, because there were so few, we took the time (there was a young work experience person to utilise at the time) to write back to all the entrants saying thanks for entering, and sending them a few of the top recipes we had received, just to be polite.
The response astonished us.
A very high number wrote back saying thanks for the recipes, and telling us how they used the products, what was right and wrong about them, all sorts of information we did not have, or had not thought was relevant.
Turned out, cottage cheese was not a “calorie avoidance food” it had uses in all sorts of areas by all sorts of people we had not seen as in our market, in fact, had not considered. The job we assumed was being done by cottage cheese, deduced by looking at our data, from our perspective, was not the job that consumers were hiring the product to do.
Long story short, we slowly built a database, all done by hand and snail mail, so it was a significant resource sink, a cottage cheese club in effect that shared recipes, stories, and funny events. All pretty mundane these days with the tools available, but a major undertaking in 1988.
Our sales went up, our promotional spend with retailers dropped, our price sensitivity reduced significantly, and had several successful range extensions, and we suddenly were making very good returns.
The moral is, make sure you understand the job that consumers hire your product to do, make sure you see it through the consumers eyes, not yours.
Oh, and two more lessons,
1. Social media marketing is not new, just the tools now availabel make it easier, so now everybody is doing it.
2. Cottage cheese is really very nice, 20 years after leaving the company, i still buy and use the product, in all sorts of odd ways, learnt from the “clubbies”. Brand building by another name.
Oct 1, 2013 | Category, Customers, Demand chains, Marketing, retail
It is pretty trite to point out, again, that the reason businesses survive is to satisfy customers.
In fresh produce markets, this has been pretty much forgotten as the share of the consumers dollar that ends up in the farmers pockets has progressively dropped over the last 50 years from around 50% to now 10% for the lucky ones.
This is below in many cases the cost of production, so there goes food security, at least at the prices we have become used to!
This squeezing of farmers has evolved as retailers have built scale, and managed their logistics to deliver margin from produce, and consumers have favored convenience and price over product “eatability”.
Now however, it may be that the worm is turning.
Some consumers, certainly a marketable proportion, are turning back to favour freshness, product provenance, and taste, and are finding those characteristics in farmers markets, direct home delivery, and the few specialist retailers who have survived. These consumers are driving the evolution of a transparent “demand chain” which is putting some leverage back into the hands of farmers, if they can figure out how to remove the impediments to transparency, and the ticket clippers who inhabit the chain.
The tools of the web are slowly turning the supply chain of old into a demand chain, a supply process that responds to consumer demand, preferences, and habits. Farmers being able to communicate with those who consume their produce, and respond accordingly disappeared when we moved en masse to the cities, as no longer were we living in the small communities that enabled the communication.
Now however, that ability is back, so use it, and eat better!
Sep 30, 2013 | Branding, Category, Marketing, retail, Small business
Consumers make purchase choices for a whole range of reasons, quality, size, experience, brand, price, freshness, produce provenance, and so on.
Supermarkets in Europe have for years been marketing their housebrands as much more than cheapo versions of branded products, they are brands themselves, with all the attributes of proprietary brands.
In Australia there have been housebrands for 35 years, I know, as I peripherally s involved in the launch of the first one, the now defunct Franklins “No Frills” margarine, in about 1978. For most of the 35 years since, Australian Housebrands were little more than cheap products, where the manufactures pulled out as much ingredient and packaging cost as possible, apart from the few regulated categories like milk where Housebrands did not appear until de-regulation of the distribution system, and ice cream where the dairy fat level is proscribed at 10%.
More recently, Housebrands have been repositioned to be more like “Brands” than cheap substitutes, and retailers are actively seeking to add product quality to the parameters, while still being extremely aggressive about product cost from the manufacturer, difference now is that the world is the potential source, not just Australian manufacturers.
However, the efforts appear to be flagging, as price remains the primary consumer purchase reason for Housebrands, but the consumers choice is being reduced as retailers allocate their shelf-space to their own brands in an effort to both build Housebrand sales and the enhanced margins they can deliver. Perhaps this is a contributor to the apparent renewed growth of specialty and niche retail, and the decision of many SME’s to avoid the two major retailers, and pursue alternative channels.
Housebrands are failing to be either guarantors of quality, as “proper” proprietary brands would be, and they are often no longer as cheap as they were, so consumers are getting confused.
In consumer confusion lies opportunity for innovative marketers.
