Are the two FMCG gorillas at a crossroads?

Are the two FMCG gorillas at a crossroads?

 

 

The retail landscape is changing, even as the two retail gorillas hunker down and set about extracting more from the current model.

Following are a few of the macro trends I see that will continue to erode the current model that has been so successful.

Declining customer loyalty.

I have no numbers, but anecdotally, where in the past you shopped at Coles or Woollies, now you have Aldi, Farmers markets, Costco, Harris Farm, and a range of specialty retailers all competing successfully for the consumers dollar. I no longer know why anyone sees any of the major retailers as ‘their’ store. Loyalty is something that is given in acknowledgement of great service, and the gorillas have failed in that space.

Changing customer habits.

Associated with loyalty, customers are looking for things other than just the lowest price.  Increasingly they want product provenance, domestically produced product, they are increasingly sensitive to the ingredient lists, and spurious health claims. This is all happening as the gorillas remove the options from their shelves in the game of short-term margins.

The continued growth of home delivery by the gorillas since Covid gave it a turbo-boost seems here to stay. Interestingly, home delivery also seems to be a useful brand building tool for the gorillas. Anecdotally, consumers tend to stick with one or the other of Coles or Woolies for delivery in greater numbers than they exhibit loyalty when shopping for themselves.

Investment attraction.

Aldi has invested successfully, Costco while going more slowly than expected, appear here to stay, farmers markets have become ‘corporatized’ to some extent, Harris Farm continues to invest, and specialty stores continue to ‘pop up’ although few survive for the long term. It seems that the market is sufficiently big, that with only two major players there is risk capital going in at the fringes, and in the long term, the fringes tend to become mainstream. Looming over all this is the shadow of Amazon, and more generally the move away from the bricks and mortar business model. I was betting a few years ago that the Harris family would cash in and sell to Amazon, a transaction consistent with their strategy in the US. So far, I have been wrong.

More recently, the public and political attention focussed on the gorillas can only have a negative impact on the investment attraction of FMCG retail.

Business model proliferation at the fringes.

While the supermarket model absolutely dominates the current landscape, technology and changing consumer attitudes are enabling evolving business models to compete for the consumers dollar. Two of my neighbours combine to buy meat in bulk direct from a farmer in the Southern highlands. It started as all the meat from a single animal, which meant lots of mince. Recently much of that mince is being made into sausages, and they are experimenting with differing sausage flavours for variety. This proliferation seems to me to be another signpost that change is coming, like it or not.

Margin pressure.

While all this is going on, margins through the supply chain are under increasing competitive pressure. This pressure impacts enormously on the decision making of incumbents, offering niche opportunities to newcomers and new business models to make a case with consumers.

It seems to me that the incumbent retailers are waiting to see what happens. History tells us that this is not an effective strategy. The better course is to shape your future in some way that suits your aspirations. It would be naive to say this was easy, it is excruciatingly hard, which is why so few are able to make the transformations necessary.

I keep on harping about the failure of Woolworths to leverage the start they made with Thomas Dux. To my mind it was a classic strategic mistake to back away.

My conclusion is that the current management culture at both the retail gorillas lacks the courage to explore, be curious, make investments that are separate from the main business, and stick to them in the face of short-term challenges. Instead, they have chosen to hunker down and optimise the current model.

 

 

What is the ‘right’ price for your product?

What is the ‘right’ price for your product?

 

This is one of the most common questions asked, particularly when configuring a new product.

The ‘right ‘ price will be the pricing model that delivers superior value to customers while delivering optimal returns to the seller.

Developing a pricing model involves a series of strategic and market driven choices. Packaging, high Vs Low, the channels used, marketing collateral deployed, shape of your business model, identification of your ideal customer, and a host of other factors that make up the ‘marketing mix’.

However, despite most of us knowing these things, typically price is set on a cost-plus basis, mixed with what others are charging for the same or similar/substitute product.

For an entirely new product, it is a guessing game that has potentially serious consequences. At one end you kill the product, at the other, you leave money on the table.

Dutch economist Peter van Westendorp introduced a method that ended up being named for him in 1976. It has been used sparingly since, but not as widely as it should be.

It is a simple and reasonably reliable method to determine the ‘right’ price for a product or service.

There are four questions that will set your price ‘guidelines’:

  • At what price would it be so cheap that you would question quality?
  • At what price would you consider the product to be a bargain?
  • At what price would you start to think the product is getting expensive, but you still might consider buying it?
  • At what price would you consider the product to be too expensive, and you would not buy it?

Analysis of the responses will give you the point at which you are attracting the most customers who make the trade-off between buying intention, price, and quality perceptions. Putting this on a simple two-dimensional chart makes explanation easy.

Header courtesy Wikipedia

 

 

Why are supermarkets so hard to deal with?

Why are supermarkets so hard to deal with?

 

Anyone dealing with Australia’s two supermarket gorillas knows how hard it is.

You know the old adage:

Question: Where does a 400 kg gorilla sleep?

Answer: Anywhere they bloody like!

Over the 45 years I have rubbed up against them, beginning as a young bloke when there were a number of now disappeared alternative retailers, it has only become harder. However, the rules of dealing with them have not changed much, just become clearer and more cut-throat.

Some years ago I did a presentation to the CEO’s of the SME group of companies who were members of the food industry lobby group AFGC. Looking back on that presentation, republished in several places, it is clear little has changed, certainly not for the better for battling SME’s.

My advice to those I work with also has not changed much, and can be summarised as:

  • Have a solid commercial foundation before you contemplate the challenges of distribution through supermarkets.
  • Never forget that retailers might be your customers, but they are not your consumers. At best they are a massive barrier between you and your consumers.
  • Be relentlessly focussed on your long- term strategy, while recognising retailers are only the means to that end, not the end itself.
  • Unless you are clearly differentiated from others, particularly in the minds of consumers, you will be a retailers breakfast.
  • Know your numbers intimately. This is the barrier upon which most are wrecked, they have insufficient control and understanding of all their costs, margins, risks, and cash flow.
  • Be very willing to say ‘No’ and live with the consequences, as they will almost always be better than the consequences of saying ‘Yes’.

These basic rules, and several others were the topics of conversation in a podcast with Chelsea Ford, published yesterday. The links to the podcast on Spotify and Apple are below.

🎧 Spotify: https://lnkd.in/dWzMN5mN
🎧 Apple Podcasts: https://lnkd.in/dq7yWGJZ

Colesworth: Is it collaborative gouging or ruthless collaboration by oligopolies.

Colesworth: Is it collaborative gouging or ruthless collaboration by oligopolies.

 

 

Collaboration between competitors is illegal, but tough to prove. It is also the natural state of affairs in an oligopoly.

When a competitive market evolves over time into an oligopoly, the focus of management attention of the remaining oligopolists moves from the customer to the competitor. With the resources available to an oligopolist in any decent sized market, they will know in considerable detail the strategies, internal processes, pricing, and resource allocation choices made by their competitors almost as quickly as they happen.

Supermarket competition in Australia has evolved in this manner. It has turned from ruthless competition for customers 40 years ago, to ruthless collaboration between the two major players now.

Collaboration is illegal, and I am sure that the leaders of the two supermarket gorillas are not setting prices together, or collaborating in other ways that would be contrary to the competition laws in this country. However, given there are only two of them, and they have the resources to watch the other very carefully, there is a sort of quasi co-operation that emerges.

It is driven by the commonality of their activities: The need for shareholder returns, driven by market share acquisition costs, both fixed and variable. They work aggressively on both, and if they did not, the senior management would be fired. In addition, directors have legislated fiduciary responsibilities under the Corporations act in relation to shareholder interests and importantly, returns.

We must also remember that via our superannuation funds, we are all shareholders in Coles and Woolworths.

Once again, just like the ‘housing crisis’, we have short term populist press release driven band-aids being suggested. They are touted as the remedy for long term strategic choices made in the past that to some, have turned sour.

The time for institutional concern about the increasing power of supermarket chains was when they were assembling the scale they now have. All of the take-overs and mergers that have happened have been waved through by the ACCC. This is despite commentary at the time about the impact of the lessening of competition for the consumers dollar.

Now it is too late, other remedies must be found, which do not include a forced break-up. Apart from the immorality of retrospectively applying new rules to the conduct of business, there is no logical or practical way to break apart either of the supermarket chains.

We should stop bleating, and get on with life, while ensuring we do not make the same mistake again.

Header credit: Gapinvoid.com. The cartoon put a huge amount of meaning into a simple graphical form. Thanks Hugh!!

 

 

 

 

4 critical strategies for FMCG profitability.

4 critical strategies for FMCG profitability.

 

Price promotion is just a price subsidy to consumers, and margin subsidy to retailers in disguise. .

In consumer goods, most volume that comes from a price promotion is just bringing forward sales that would have happened anyway, just over a longer time-frame. Alternatively, it is volume taken from an opposition product by buyers who will avoid ever paying the full retail by switching products based on price. It is common in FMCG for consumers to have a basket of ‘acceptable’ products that they shop from via promotional pricing.

Over the 45 years I have spent in FMCG, I have seen the terminal erosion of most proprietary brands on supermarket shelves as a direct result.

In times of inflation, the gap in real wages and price widens. This pressure will only increase over the next year or so as retailers push for better and better price promotional deals, despite the current focus on their pricing tactics.

Now is a great time to go broke being successful at securing price driven promotional slots.

To dodge the ‘go broke’ outcome, there are a few simple to say but very difficult to implement marketing practises.

Understand the elasticity of demand for your product, and tactically market accordingly. This requires that you quantify the break-even points between the tactical volume increases you generate while on promotion, the lost margin from the discount, and the cost of the promotional slot. The strategic challenge here is that erosion of margin happens over time, as buyers from whom your product is in their ‘basket’ wait to buy on promotion, and most often only buy then.

Zig as others zag. Many, if not most suppliers will stop advertising, and direct the funds into short term price and promotional activity. This offers the opportunity for those brave enough to take it to generate a higher share of advertising voice for less. Over time. the body of research that examines the relationship between brand health and price delivers irrefutable evidence of the negative impact of price on brand health. Advertising share of voice is a leading indicator of market share. In tough times, most cut advertising investment to salvage the bottom line, as advertising is seen as an expense rather than an investment in future profitability.

Understand the reality of attribution. It is way too easy to make simplistic single source attribution of price promotion as the driver of volume. This moves the sightline from the more important ‘delivered’ margin. We now have the tools to do a much better job than has been the case in the past of separating volume and margin. However, the explosion of digital channels and tools has led to a quagmire of conflicting attribution claims, most of which are no better than marginal contributors.

As a kid, the Arnott’s red trucks delivering biscuits to supermarkets were always polished to a high level, no blemish in the polish was allowed. Even now, over 60 years later, that stays with me as an indicator of the effort put into quality which feeds into my view of the Arnott’s brand, despite the years, and ownership changes.

Resist the siren song of volume. For an SME to be successful, they need to make a whole series of tough choices. Amongst the most seductive of those choices is the perceived trade-off between price and volume. I say perceived because most see the trade-off as the traditional price/volume choice drawn as the graph they saw in Economics 101. It is grossly misleading to see it in this one-dimensional way. Consumers make their purchase choice on a whole range of ‘value-delivery’ parameters, of which price is only one. When you allow it to be the only one, it will logically dominate. As a marketer, your task is to make price a minor component of the purchase choice consumers make. While short term that may dampen volume, and even deny you distribution in a retailer, the point of being in business is to make enough to remain in business. You will not do this by giving away margin for no return.

Know your costs. This seems pretty obvious. However, the number of SME’s that do not understand the detail of their costs and the difference between marginal costs and overheads never ceases to amaze me. One of the most valuable tools, previously noted, in the SME toolbox is a sophisticated understanding of their break even. When you have this model working it enables you to add in some assessment of the impact of price and volume over time. It enables consideration of the impact of pulling forward your sales volume and delivered margin on promotion, the volume and margin delivered off promotion, and volume and margin impacts of competitive promotions.

Following are a few of the many research reports that articulate the linkages between price, volume, and brand salience. I include them to demonstrate the views expressed above are way more than just my opinion.

https://tinyurl.com/496vwphy Ehrenberg Bass. Brand health (podcast)

https://tinyurl.com/4wzkebav Ehrenberg Bass. Brand salience

https://tinyurl.com/4b5er6rc Amity University. Impact of price promotion on brand equity.

https://tinyurl.com/36fr8xwf Research Gate. Long term effects of price promotion on brand choice and purchase quantity