Dec 4, 2014 | Category, Marketing, Operations, retail, Small business
Data management & analysis
The second of 10 ways to beat the supermarket gorillas at their own game, after understanding the way the supermarket business model works, is to be savvy with data.
Supermarket retailing is heavily data intensive. These days, any retailing beyond the archetypical lemonade stand by the side of the road is data intensive, but particularly supermarkets. Commonly a supermarket range is up to 30,000 Sku’s across a number of different formats and geographic and demographic locations, and several thousand suppliers, all with their own focus and story to tell.
The supermarkets physical space needs to be allocated across the Sku’s chosen to be on range in the way that best delivers a return on their investment in the particular store and strategically across the chain.
SME suppliers to chain supermarkets usually are playing from a position of weakness, as they lack the scale to have the data and category management resources that supermarkets demand. However, their strength is that they can be far more agile and market sensitive that their bigger rivals, often SME’s can develop and launch a product before a multinational can get the first development workshop together.
Whilst supermarkets have a wealth of data at their fingertips, both their own, and that supplied by their large suppliers, they recognise that not every piece of data is worth the digits it is written with. Data is only of any value if it leads to some sort of actionable insight, and it is here that SME’s have an advantage despite the disadvantage of small size. Making the connections between differing seemingly disconnected data points is where the gold is hidden.
There are several points at which data can be collected, from which insights can be gained. Internal, observed and purchased.
- Sales and margin history. No SME should be without a robust and detailed sales and margin analysis of their own sales history, and thus ability to forecast with some certainty. Every SME has a sales history in their accounting package, most do not use it. Most use the “Office” package, which included Excel, but many do not use the power of the tools in excel. Pivot tables are the most underutilised and useful tool I have ever seen for SME’s. If you are one of the majority who do not use them, wake up, spend 30 minutes on YouTube figuring out the basics, and start generating insights. Also in excel is the V-Lookup tool, which can be enormously valuable to SME’s to keep accurate track of a whole range of variables in their business.
- Sales intelligence. SME’s are usually in a position to have unfiltered market intelligence in the hands of decision makers easily and quickly. Usually the people best positioned to see change as it is evolving are those in direct contact with customers and consumers, often the lower paid front line staff. Being engaged with these staff, or indeed as is the case for many, being that staff as a part of the role of the SME business owner puts you in a position to see shifts as they occur, if you are watching. Finding a way to turn these random conversations and insights into data points that can be connected and acted on can build into a significant competitive advantage. There is no substitute for the insights gained by simply watching and understanding the drivers of consumer behaviour, then crafting an offer that adds value.
- Agile operations. Scale brings its own momentum, despite the huge improvements over the last 20 years by the adoption of Lean practises. Large suppliers to supermarkets, with large factories, fixed planning cycles and extended supply chains are often caught short by the unexpected and unplanned. Agile suppliers can often fill the gaps created, but do so they need to be able to make very quick decision on costs, time frames, and operational priorities and limitations. To make these decisions, they need absolute understanding of their cash and financial position, costs and decision drivers like break even points, the impact of discounts, and negotiation trade-offs they can make. To be truly agile, you need accurate and detailed financial and operational data that is easily useable to make well informed decisions, then track the outcomes of those decisions.
- Be experimental. Having good data enables experimentation on a scale that offers great insights, but minimises risk. The supermarkets are increasingly amenable to enabling SME’s to experiment with all sorts of offerings as they learn as well from the activity. However, you cannot just walk in and expect to be taken seriously without a history of sensible innovation and a relationship with the individual decision makers in the retailer. Having robust, realistic and well understood strategic and operational planning in place is a must if you wish to be experimental and stay in business.
- Purchase syndicated data. Scan data can be purchased in many forms, and to varying degrees of analysis and detail. There is a significant cost to this information, firstly the purchase costs, but more importantly, the data analysis capabilities. Increasingly scan data is being matched to the behavioural data emerging from store loyalty cards to add another dimension to decision making, and this trend will only accelerate. SME’e can dip in and out of this data, taking a slice here and there to provide insights without the significant investment of being fully engaged. Treated sensibly, it can be used a bit like market research, taking a small and well defined sample and using it as representative of the whole picture.
None of this is easy, which is OK, because if it was, everyone would be doing it. However, many SME’s simply think it is all too hard, and stay away, effectively walking away from 75% of the volume in the market. For many, this is a sensible decision, but for some, those SME’s with a genuine opportunity to become larger businesses, building solid capabilities in collecting and leveraging data is essential.
Nov 27, 2014 | Branding, Category, Change, Marketing, retail, Small business
A short while ago, I posted “10 strategies for SME’s to beat the supermarket gorillas at their own game” which generated quite a bit of comment and feedback. Amongst the feedback were a number of requests to go into more detail on each of the strategies, and so this is the first of the series, focussed on understanding the business model of the supermarkets.
I deliberately used the word “Gorillas” because of the extraordinarily concentrated nature of Australia’s supermarket retailers, with Coles and Woolworths between them holding over 70% of FMCG sales depending on the category, and whose numbers you believe.
You know the old question: “where do the 500kg gorillas sleep?”
Answer: “anywhere they bloody like”
That was the way it was, a comfy duopoly, however, more recently there have been some major strategy alterations by Coles which has dramatically lifted their financial performance, and Aldi has successfully carved out a growing niche as a third retail presence. In addition, there are still some very good independent retailers around operating out of the wholesaler Metcash, who also competes with some of their own and franchised retail outlets.
This mix, combined with the opportunities suppliers have to sell into food service and institutional markets and increasingly direct to consumers via the net and other means makes for an environment where the agile and insightful suppliers can be very successful despite the obstacles, but it is a very challenging environment.
The concept of business models is well known, in summary, it is the expression of how a business makes money. It always involves a matrix of revenue generated, the fixed and variable costs of generating that revenue, and the choices that the business makes about its customers and how they will be serviced, and the way they incur the costs of that servicing.
Supermarkets are a great example of a number of seemingly similar competitors that have slightly differing business models. At a macro level they have strong similarities, relying on volume, price, and shopper numbers to succeed, but everyone who shops knows that Woolworths is not Coles, is not Aldi.
However, they do have some common building blocks.
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- Revenue generation. Supermarkets generate revenue on both sides of the equation.
- Shoppers buy products, paying at the checkout.
- Suppliers “pay” for shelf space via a range of charges levied for every variable the retailers can dream up. Volume discounts, payment terms, promotional levies, preferred shelf positioning, promotional slots, access to sales information, and a host of others. Some are items for which suppliers receive an invoice, others are taken as discounts off the invoice price, increasingly applied automatically as a part of the trading term package.
- Cost management. Supermarkets work on very low percentage margins, relying on the volume to generate the cash margins.
- Fixed costs are a significant part of retailers total costs, made up of the provision of the retail floor space, the logistics infrastructure and personnel. Supermarkets attack their fixed cost base aggressively using their scale as negotiation tools with landlords and logistics suppliers, while keeping a very substantial proportion of front line retail staff as casuals rather than permanent employees so they can better adjust staff levels to match activity. The sorts of choices retailers make are between high density shopping centre locations Vs stand alone locations. There are costs and benefits to each which are considered as a part of their strategic decision making.
- The biggest variable cost is the cost of good sold, and they similarly use their scale to manage those costs downward. Tactics vary between retailers, but the core game is to maximise their margins while keeping prices as low as possible to attract the volume buyers. This is an extremely delicate balance.
- Transaction costs are usually pretty well hidden in most businesses, but are really significant in the case of supermarkets simply due to the number of transactions they make. For example, there is a cost to managing the buying relationship with a supplier, but the larger the supplier, the less is the total costs/unit of sale of managing that relationship. This has led to a dramatic reduction of the number of suppliers supermarkets have in any category over the last 15 years or so a trend further accelerated by the increasingly common strategy of limiting the number of proprietary brands in any category substituting house-branded products, and reducing the number of relationships to be managed. This has made negotiating shelf space increasingly hard, and because of scarcity, increasingly expensive for suppliers, in turn putting extreme pressure on small suppliers.
- Customer service and relationships. The retailers have each made choices about the pricing, location, ranging, and service strategies that sets them apart from each other, and more subtly, they have back office strategies that differ. However, their common aim is to have as much market share ass possible, as volume is the profit generator.
- As in any market, no retailer can be all things to all people, so each makes the choice of the “ideal” customer, and markets towards them, grateful for any overlap. Increasingly the marketing is being supported by customer loyalty cards and the data mining and personalised promotional opportunities that technology is delivering, but the fundamental measures of success remain unchanged: number of shoppers, share of wallet, and basket size.
- The two major retailers have very large marketing budgets which they spend in a wide variety of ways, across all channels of communication with customers and potential customers, and often in joint activity with their suppliers, which inevitably, the suppliers end up funding in return for volume. The smaller the retailer, the less “mass market” they are, so the tactics tend to differ, although strategically, finding willing supplier partners is a core part of every retailers marketing mix.
- Consumers generally want choice when they are in a supermarket, the more the better, in any category. Woolworths and Coles stores carry 12-20,000 Sku’s (Stock keeping unit) depending on the size and location of the store, a typical IGA might carry 8-10,000, while Aldi carry just over 1,000. The sku’s carried in any store also reflect of the demographic and cultural mix. The Woolworths store in Auburn in Sydney has a significantly different product mix to the Woolworths of a similar size in Double Bay.
- Every retailer uses some form of category management disciplines as a means to monitor, adjust and locate their inventory onto the sales face in the way that best meets their customers needs and maximises impulse pick-up. This is always a data intensive mix of the volume and margin of the individual Sku, (such as Ski strawberry yoghurt 200gm) group of similar Sku’s (all strawberry 200gm yoghurt) subcategory (all strawberry yoghurt) and category (all yoghurt) and between categories. They make choices about how many brands and types to keep in stock, where they put them, on shelf and in relation to other yogurts, and indeed other chilled products. A facing of yoghurt added is a facing of some other product gone, as the sides of the stores are not elastic. At the core of the category management activities is the need to best satisfy consumers, whilst competing effectively and delivering maximised margins.
Being agile, persistent, and prepared to experiment are about the best qualities a supplier to supermarkets can have.
Apr 24, 2014 | Branding, Category, Customers, Marketing, retail
Businesses spend many millions trying to understand the way consumers consider the choices confronting them in a supermarket. With up to 30,000 items on shelf, and some categories having hundreds of choices, it is a key consideration.
A mix of psychology, data science, habitual behaviour, discretionary spending dollars available, and individual preferences all play a role.
A complicated mix.
However, there is a way to at least clarify part of the mix.
Consumers use decision trees, usually without thinking about them when they are in a supermarket making their purchases.
Some purchases are automatic, a habitual choice, others are made after a considered set of choices on a range of factors important to the individual are made, and there are, obviously, many shades of this continuum that apply to a highly personal process.
Imagine a consumer approaching the dairy case looking for fruited yoghurt. Some may just buy their usual brand, flavour and size irrespective of everything else. Others will make a series of choices that will vary for every person, and may look something like the decision tree below.
It will differ for each individual, some will choose the brand first, others the flavour, or the size and price, and a whole range of variations on these factors, but based on the total sales, supermarkets will range products, and give them shelf positions and space based on sales, gross margins, delivered margins, and various promotional strategies. They also use a decision tree.
Retailers and suppliers spend huge amounts of effort, and resources. on this category management exercise, trying to read the consumers mind, and anticipate their reactions to various combinations that are available to them.
It is a data intensive exercise, well suited to the “big data” techniques that are evolving around us. Combining checkout data with store loyalty cards is now becoming commonplace, what is emerging currently is the integration of mobile and social media data into the mix.
As you walk into the store to buy something, there has already been lots of effort gone into reading your mind, and there will be lots of effort and money expended in store in an effort to manage your purchase decisions.
Nov 12, 2013 | Category, Change, Governance, Leadership, Strategy
Years ago there was a line in the film “Breaker Morant” where the breaker, played by Bryan Brown said of a young ladies virtue “another slice off a cut loaf will not be missed” .
I never forgot the line, and have used it often, usually to make the point that a collection of small, and in themselves insignificant changes all added up eventually make a big difference. Just like a loaf, one slice may not be missed, but lose some more, and soon enough you have no loaf left.
The treasurer approved the takeover of Warnambool Cheese and Butter (WCB) earlier today by the Canadian group Saputo, should the current take-over squabble turn out in their favour
The original Saputo offer of $7.00/share has now been upped to a current $8.00 with current share price well north, there is anticipation of further action by Bega Murray Golbourn, or Fonterra.
It is now inevitable that WCB will cease to be an independent dairy processor, it just remains to be determined if it will be owned domestically or by an international entity.
The WCB directors have done a pretty good job by their shareholders, their shares are now trading at 8.50, after being stuck around $4 for a considerable period up till July, after some pretty crap results. This is despite being a strategic supplier in an industry with demand growing strongly, particularly in Asia.
There is a bit to go, but WCB is as good as no more. Now to the offer of ADM for Graincorp, a decision slated for December 17, and feted as the more important of the two decisions due to the competitive stranglehold Graincorp has on grain handling infrastructure in the eastern states. If nothing else, the pathetic blustering of Warren Truss , and acerbic one-liners from Barnaby Joyce will be worth waiting for.
The real concern however, is the long term impact of having major food producing industries controlled overseas. Without being in the least bit xenophobic, and recognising that Australia simply does not generate enough capital to fund all the demand for capital in the economy, it cannot be healthy for the prospects of our grandchildren to be so beholden to the overseas boardrooms who control the food supply chains.
Stop the presses:
Murray Goulburn has made a further offer for WCB on Thursday 14th of $9/share, a substantial premium over the current Saputo $8/share offer, and over the closing price of $8.50 on the exchange. This is pretty heady stuff for a business that has consistently failed to deliver adequate returns to shareholders for some years, and it is hard to see how Saputo can go much further without the rationalisation benefits that MG would have.
Stop the presses, again!
It is Sunday 17th, not a day of rest in the dairy industry. Murray Goulburn has indicated that they will beat the latest Saputo offer, price to be announced, but they have the hurdle of competition policy to jump, stupid as that is in these circumstances. So, the deliriously happy WCB shareholders have the choice of taking the unconditional Saputo offer now, or waiting a bit to see what MG has in store. Meanwhile, Bega have upped their bid, but it is below the Saputo bid, so is essentially irrelevant. However, what is not irrelevant is the Bega shareholding in WCB, which along with that of MG and Fonterra add up to around 40% of WCB.
Whatever happens to WCB this coming week, Bega will come into play as soon as the dust has settled, perhaps sooner, as it is one of the very few Australian dairy assets left bigger than a paddock with a few cows and a bathtub.
Oct 17, 2013 | Branding, Category, Customers, Innovation, Marketing
Cottage cheese is a pretty dull category in supermarkets. A relatively tasteless, low calorie (therefore it must taste crappy, right?), price competitive, group of products.
Yes, so we thought.
Years ago, 25 years in fact, I was the GM Marketing of a major Australian diary company with the leading brand of Cottage cheese. I thought all of the above, and we struggled to make any return, let alone one that was a competitive use of the capital tied up.
We had very good data, for the time, remembering this is pre-internet. We knew who sold our, and competitive brands in what quantities, and pretty much to whom, as we had good U&A (usage and attitude) data. As a result we were able to segment the market pretty well by usage, demographics, geography, and basket. However, whatever we did, we had trouble moving the sales needle.
Almost as a last resort, we ran a small recipe competition on the side of the packs, easy, low cost, a prize draw of a holiday at a health resort on the Gold Coast. We got a few hundred entries, a failure by our pre-agreed metrics, so we thought we knew something else that did not work. However, because there were so few, we took the time (there was a young work experience person to utilise at the time) to write back to all the entrants saying thanks for entering, and sending them a few of the top recipes we had received, just to be polite.
The response astonished us.
A very high number wrote back saying thanks for the recipes, and telling us how they used the products, what was right and wrong about them, all sorts of information we did not have, or had not thought was relevant.
Turned out, cottage cheese was not a “calorie avoidance food” it had uses in all sorts of areas by all sorts of people we had not seen as in our market, in fact, had not considered. The job we assumed was being done by cottage cheese, deduced by looking at our data, from our perspective, was not the job that consumers were hiring the product to do.
Long story short, we slowly built a database, all done by hand and snail mail, so it was a significant resource sink, a cottage cheese club in effect that shared recipes, stories, and funny events. All pretty mundane these days with the tools available, but a major undertaking in 1988.
Our sales went up, our promotional spend with retailers dropped, our price sensitivity reduced significantly, and had several successful range extensions, and we suddenly were making very good returns.
The moral is, make sure you understand the job that consumers hire your product to do, make sure you see it through the consumers eyes, not yours.
Oh, and two more lessons,
1. Social media marketing is not new, just the tools now availabel make it easier, so now everybody is doing it.
2. Cottage cheese is really very nice, 20 years after leaving the company, i still buy and use the product, in all sorts of odd ways, learnt from the “clubbies”. Brand building by another name.
Oct 1, 2013 | Category, Customers, Demand chains, Marketing, retail
It is pretty trite to point out, again, that the reason businesses survive is to satisfy customers.
In fresh produce markets, this has been pretty much forgotten as the share of the consumers dollar that ends up in the farmers pockets has progressively dropped over the last 50 years from around 50% to now 10% for the lucky ones.
This is below in many cases the cost of production, so there goes food security, at least at the prices we have become used to!
This squeezing of farmers has evolved as retailers have built scale, and managed their logistics to deliver margin from produce, and consumers have favored convenience and price over product “eatability”.
Now however, it may be that the worm is turning.
Some consumers, certainly a marketable proportion, are turning back to favour freshness, product provenance, and taste, and are finding those characteristics in farmers markets, direct home delivery, and the few specialist retailers who have survived. These consumers are driving the evolution of a transparent “demand chain” which is putting some leverage back into the hands of farmers, if they can figure out how to remove the impediments to transparency, and the ticket clippers who inhabit the chain.
The tools of the web are slowly turning the supply chain of old into a demand chain, a supply process that responds to consumer demand, preferences, and habits. Farmers being able to communicate with those who consume their produce, and respond accordingly disappeared when we moved en masse to the cities, as no longer were we living in the small communities that enabled the communication.
Now however, that ability is back, so use it, and eat better!
