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What SME management should know before investing in chasing government grants | StrategyAudit

 

 

Most SME’s I meet have at one time or another contemplated, and often invested considerable resources in the quest to obtain public grant funds.

Rarely do they approach this exercise with any understanding of the disconnect between the way the commercial world, and the bureaucratic one work. They assume that what to them is normal and obvious is reflected in the bureaucratic processes.

Wrong.

For context, 25 years ago I ran a small grant-funding outfit called Agri Chain Solutions that had been outsourced from the then Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Agriculture at the express direction of the then newly elected Prime Minister Howard.  ACS was a Company, limited by guarantee with a largely commercial, board with two members from the senior ranks of AFFA and Austrade. The chairman had been a very successful MD of a very large business in the food industry. I was recruited as a senior manager with extensive experience in FMCG and agriculture.

Following are some relevant observations from that time about how the bureaucracies operate, which from what I can see, remain accurate.

  • Departmental budgets are set annually in line with the governments policies and priorities. While program budgets are often spread over a number of years, they are reviewed and changed as necessary, or for a hundred other reasons, annually.
  • Departments put in their ‘bids’ in the pre-budget preparation, which includes the costs of running the department, as well as the cost of the programs for which they are arguing.
        • Departmental overheads have been progressively cut over years by shedding heads, which are then contracted back as an ‘off the books’ expenditure, usually netted off against program costs, or just classified as an unavoidable cost overrun.
        • The status of public servants is measured by the number of reports, direct and indirect (i.e., reporting to someone who reports to them) they have, and the size of the budgets they manage. This leads to an ongoing turf war between departments, and sections within departments for status, and public service grades that determine pay and advancement.
  • Public servants are typically held loosely accountable for the expenditure of money compared to the budget allocated. This has absolutely no relationship to the outcome generated by the programs they manage. To my mind, this mismatch of expenditure and accountability is at the core of much of the waste that occurs. It is also the factor that leads to the mad rush to ensure that budgets are all spent before June 30. An underspend will be seen as a sign that a cut is possible, while an overspend is seen as bad luck, with no recriminations, or understanding of the drivers of the overspend.
  • Program reviews done by an ‘outside’ neutral agency are built into the program costs, but neutrality is a joke, as the current PWC fiasco demonstrates. In ACS’s case, the review was done by KPMG, who had to do three revisions to get to a program report AFFA was happy with, in order to get paid. As you might guess, draft 1 was OK by me, draft 2 was nonsense, and draft 3 was total bullshit that bore no relationship to the success, or otherwise of ACS expenditure. I was bitterly and noisily opposed to the final report submitted, but was advised that my disagreement while noted informally, was not relevant. I could not change the world, so I should just get on with life.
  • Grant program budgets allow a percentage of the total program to be held back for ‘Administration’. In the case of ACS, that amount was 20%, a laughable amount, as the total expenditure on all ACS overheads and project management was around 6% of the program budget. All AFFA did was use the withheld amount as a slush fund.
  • Program budgets are broken up to make keeping track easy, bearing no relationship to the way money should be spent to optimise the outcomes. In ACS’s case, we had $9 million over 3 years, minus the withheld admin cost. The department broke the total into 12 equal quarterly amounts and insisted that was the budget. Pointing out that it took 18 months to get good projects up and running, during which time little grant money would be allocated had little effect. In the last 18 months more than the quarterly ‘budget’ amount was to be allocated, which caused great angst in the department. I also pointed out that at the original sunset of 3 years, there would be projects that had not been completed, that ACS and AFFA had a moral if not contractual obligation to see through. After much discussion, we negotiated a 12-month extension for nominated projects that were then shuffled into the follow up program, the National Food Industry Strategy, with a contractor to administer them.
  • Senior public servants speak about accrual accounting as being the base of their accounting processes. ‘Nonsense. It is cash accounting, there are no accruals involved, anywhere.
  • There is a myriad of ‘allowances’ that foster rorting and destroy accountability. I came into contact mostly with those relating to travel. The intent is sensible: make the management simple. However, the effect is to enable officials travelling to rort the system. E.g. A level X official is allowed an amount/day for meals and accommodation, without any paperwork showing expenses incurred. Predictably, they travel as much as possible to places where they have friends and families, claim the whole amount, and pocket the lot, or stay in a cheap hotel, eat as cheaply as possible, and pocket the difference.
  • Finally, for all the babbling about innovation that goes on, it represents the antithesis of the cultural abhorrence bureaucracies have with risk. Innovation is impossible without risk, and risk seen in hindsight is always weaponised as a mistake by those who oppose. As was once said to me by a senior bureaucrat in a well lubricated social setting “my job is to ensure my minister is never seen as stupid, and you know who my minister is, so you know how hard my job is’.

None of this is to denigrate public servants, quite the contrary. As individuals, they are generally a well-educated and potentially powerful force for good, frustrated by the constraints of the culture within which they work. The challenge is changing the culture that has been encouraged to grow around them, a task belonging to those with the power to do so, the politicians.