Focus, competence, and a trip to ROMA

Focus, competence, and a trip to ROMA

Management attention is an investment.

However, I have never seen a calculation of that investment made without the benefit of hindsight. Considering the return on management attention (ROMA) seems to be a sensible element of investment due diligence.

As a consultant I’m always urging clients to focus their resources, time, money, expertise, operational capacity against a narrow field. This focus of resource is always superior to a generalised approach in winning in the short term.

Nowhere are military metaphors more appropriate then in a competitive commercial environment. Every general knows that to win the battle, he needs overwhelming force in a specific space.

However, every general also knows that a war is not won in a single battle. To win the war, you also must be able to adjust to changes in the context in which the war is being waged and respond accordingly.

Years ago, while working for Cerebos, I was responsible for Cerola muesli, now departed from supermarket shelves. In those days there were only a few major SKUs in the breakfast cereal aisle. Wheat Bix, Kellogg’s Corn Flakes, Rice bubbles, and a few other relatively minor SKUs. Muesli was out on the fringes, widely seen as ‘tree hugger food’.

As an extension to Cerola, we created a strategy that straddled the gap between those major cereals and muesli and named it ‘Light & Crunchy’.

We launched it into a test in South Australia. We believed we could build the Cerola brand to be more than just ‘hippie-food’ by creating a new category in the Cereal market. There was an unmet need, a potential gap in the market. That gap could be leveraged (we believed) with a good product and effective marketing programs to generate trial, which would lead to repeat purchase.

The early stages of the test were an enormous success. We easily got retail distribution, consumer trial and repurchase rates that were well above our benchmarks for a successful test.

The significant miscalculation made was not anticipating the weight of the response from Kellogg’s.

It came very quickly with a competitive product called ‘Just Right’, a direct copy of Light and Crunchy. Just Right still exists, which validates our identification of the unmet need. Kellogg’s competitive launch was supported by overwhelming advertising, consumer promotions, and instore promotional support. That massive, focused response by Kellogg’s simply blew us away, and killed any thoughts of continuing.

Kellogg’s saw our test launch of Light & Crunchy as a significant incursion into their territory. They had previously left us alone in Muesli. Research indicated that muesli, as it had been, was not competing for the same consumers who were purchasing Corn Flakes, Rice Bubbles, and Sanitarium’s Wheat Bix.

With Cerola Light and Crunchy, we changed that, and Kellogg’s reacted with extreme aggression. I had failed to anticipate the reaction, which was with the benefit of hindsight, absolutely predictable.

The real lesson was that we did not have what it took to be competent in the breakfast cereal market. While competence is a term that most would see as a measure of skill, in this instance it was more than that. It was a measure also of our depth of knowledge of the market, the competitive drivers that existed, and sufficiently deep pockets to wage a competitive war on Kellogg’s home turf.

Our attention was too focussed on the opportunity we saw in the market, but substantially lacking in attention to the wider competitive context. We had a skewed focus of attention, and the return on that lack of attention taught us a painful lesson.

‘ROMA’. Return on Management Attention, is always a strategic driver, rarely adequately considered.

The role of medicine in marketing

The role of medicine in marketing

 

 

Customers buy to relieve some sort of pain, or fill a need. Sometimes that pain is real, the need  genuine, and sometimes it just takes the form of a psychological itch that needs scratching.

Whatever the form and source or type of the pain, nobody buys without it, so your product is medicine for that pain.

Why don’t you tell them that more often?

Be clear: ‘This product is for people who……..’

Many years ago I was marketing manager of the Dairy foods division of the then Australian owned Dairy farmers Ltd. We marketed Ski yogurt, and had been killed by Yoplait who launched with great advertising, packaging innovation, and a pretty good product that had massively increased yoghurt consumption, with them taking all the benefit.

The manufacturing process installed to produce Yoplait ensured that there was no discrete fruit pieces in the end product. It may have been strawberry yogurt, but the product was completely homogeneous. The process Dairy Farmers had installed was different, and we could  produce a product with discrete and obvious fruit pieces.

The core of platform of our marketing and innovation processes become ‘Ski: for those who like to see pieces of fruit n their yoghurt. We never used this line, but it was implicit in everything we did.

5 years later, Ski was market leader in a market many times bigger than when Yoplait had launched. While it may  not have been painful to buy a fruited yoghurt with no discrete pieces of fruit, when the offer was made, the preference of many became immediately clear.

Sadly, the innovative momentum that drove  both Ski and Yoplait was dissipated by a presumed plateau in the market size in the mid nineties, and resultant transfer of resources and energy to kow-towing to retailers.

 

 

 

The case for the ‘inert’ customer.

The case for the ‘inert’ customer.

 

 

Goodhart’s law tells us that when a measure becomes a KPI, it ceases to be a good measure. The full text of his observation appeared in the footnotes of his presentation at a conference in 1970 held by the Reserve Bank of Australia: “Whenever a government seeks to rely on previously observed statistical regularity for control purposes that regularity will collapse’

That observation is as relevant to every enterprise as it is to government.

Every dashboard produced by CRM systems I have seen makes the mistake of trashing Dr. Goodhardt’s insight.

Customers are subjected to all sorts of profiling as marketers do another iteration of their ‘ideal customers’ and ‘customer Journey’ maps using a different set of assumptions.

One set rarely used, at least rarely in my experience is the ‘inert’ customer.

Most analyses of customers I have seen use some variation of the pareto distribution. A few customers are deemed heavy users, with a decreasing level of usage down to light and occasional. The only alternative to one of these descriptions is ‘Lost’.

Any examination of ‘lost’ customers will reveal that a significant percentage of them are those that simply went ‘inert’ following a failure of customer service to meet their expectations.

For some, the expectations are unrealistic, for others, it is more like a metaphorical shrug of the shoulders. These customers are not lost, they may be just inert, and possibly able to be reactivated by a demonstration of the customer service they expected being available.

Figuring out who in your lost customers list is really just inert may just require asking. This is always far cheaper, and in my experience, more effective than hunting for new customers.

A former client had an extensive list of what they deemed ‘lost’ opportunities. They sold (and still do) a complex product that did a specific job much better than the alternative standard product. When they interrogated that ‘Lost’ data base they discovered that a sizeable proportion had not bought elsewhere. They had gone ‘inert.’ Some were just waiting for a ‘nudge’ which was often just the information and reassurance that the product they initially enquired about was the most appropriate for the job that they had put on the back burner.

Header: Charles Goodhardt speaking to a large audience.

 

To build an FMCG brand you must defy Pareto

To build an FMCG brand you must defy Pareto

 

 

The Pareto principle, the 80/20 rule with variation in the numbers, works in every situation I have ever seen.

Almost.

It is the exception that makes the rule.

Marketers use it extensively to allocate marketing budgets across competing arenas. Define your ideal customer, understand purchase cycles and habits, recognise different behaviours in different channels and circumstances, and allocate accordingly.

It always seemed to both make sense and work well.

Until it did not.

Research done by Andrew Ehrenberg, Gerald Goodhardt, and Chris Chatfield in 1984 produced a statistical model called the ‘Dirichlet Model‘. It is a statistical reflection of how consumers actually behave across FMCG categories. The model showed that rather than repetitive brand loyalty, most consumers buy from a small repertoire of acceptable options.

The model reveals that many people purchase a brand only now and then, yet collectively they represent a huge share of total sales. This counters the popular pareto model that assumes 80% of profit comes from the top 20% of buyers.

Hovering around supermarket shelves in the eighties, observing consumer behaviour, and interacting where possible, the truth of this counter intuitive behaviour was clear. However, the pull of Pareto was powerful, so we often had a foot in both camps.

It is the mid 1980s, and yogurt is the new category growth star. Ski and Yoplait dominate store shelves. Shoppers have their personal preferences, some lean strongly toward Ski, others swear by Yoplait, and many have their flavour favourite across both. (they prefer Ski Strawberry to Yoplait, but the Yoplait apricot to Ski) A few smaller regional players also vie for attention, but if there’s a promotion, most consumers happily mix it up.

As the marketing manager that included Ski in the brand portfolio of responsibility during these heady growth days, it was easy to assume the Pareto principle held: 80% of profits come from 20% of devoted buyers. Focus on those heavy consumers, turn the moderate fans into loyalists, and watch the profits roll in, right?

The Dirichlet model exposed the paradox, although at the time I had not heard of it. However, the numbers coming from store sales data and simple observation of consumer behaviour in stores confirmed the consumers disassociation from the theory of Wilfredo Pareto.

So, how does the Dirichlet model suggest fast moving consumer marketers build their brands against competitive brands and the power of retailer ‘pirate’ brands?

Acknowledge Mixed Brand Buying.

Even if you’re proud of your loyal fans, don’t be blinded by them. Ski-lovers might switch to Yoplait for a flavour your brand doesn’t offer, or vice versa. The data shows people happily shop around, even if they have a ‘Favorite.’ Acknowlede that behaviour while creatively giving consumers reasons to buy yours in preference to others.

Look for Wider Reach.

Heavy users are part of the story, but broad availability is often the bigger deal. If your products aren’t visible, buyers won’t remember you at that decisive moment.

Keep Things Distinctive.

You’re not just building brand awareness, you’re building mental availability. That’s how you stay top-of-mind when the shopper sees a new promotion or wants a unique flavour. Whether through catchy ads, recognizable packaging, or fun limited-edition variants, it’s all about creating mental triggers.

Rotate and Refresh.

Both leading yoghurt brands tested new flavours and replaced underperformers regularly. This strategy not only sparked interest among loyal buyers but also tempted the light or occasional buyer who came for the novelty, and might just pick you again next time. It also pleased retailers to have a supplier that explicitly had a ‘one in one out’ brand policy.

 

Ultimately, the Dirichlet model teaches us that brand loyalty isn’t an all-or-nothing affair. Even with strong preferences, people jump around.

Consider that next time you’re rethinking a marketing campaign. It might feel odd to invest in those who buy you only once in a while, but that large group can deliver a collective boost that keeps you on top.

 

 Header by AI

Pareto killed by Dirichlet in blogs

The pareto principle holds in every domain I have ever seen, except one.

To build a brand, you must keep existing customers, increase their preference for your brand, and attract new customers.

A pareto allocation of marketing funds would imply that most of your budget should be aimed at the 20% of customers that produce 80% of your profit.

That allocation would work against you.

Truly loyal customers are less likely to go elsewhere than light or occasional buyers, and such an allocation does nothing to attract new users.

In this case, Pareto was wrong.

 

Why the most profitable customers only buy once.

Why the most profitable customers only buy once.

It seems that everyone in marketing now worships at the altar of Lifetime Customer Value. The problem arises when the item is treated as a one off sale, bought only once, or very occasionally.

They pitch it in courses and webinars as the golden ticket to getting rich quick.  Cynical, but true?

Forget generating monthly engagement and pushing free trials. If you’re selling homes or high-end cars, your customer isn’t looking to swipe their card again anytime soon. These are one off deals. So where does LCV fit?

Simple: it hides in plain sight.

For big-ticket items, the real lifetime value isn’t in repeat purchases, it’s in reputation. It’s in the willingness of your customers to recommend you. Think of it as latent value embedded in social proof.

That five-star Google review is nice, but what you really want is for that customer to feel like you’ve done such a remarkable job that they must become your apostle. They brag about you at dinner parties. They drop your name into WhatsApp groups. They drag their friends to your showroom. That’s when lifetime value becomes real.

It’s not easy to measure. This isn’t click-tracking or coupon redemption. This is a slower game, built on service excellence, and value delivery service which build trust.

A client of mine employs this strategy. They work their butts off to do a great job, they ask for referrals, ideally those happy customers make the initial introduction, delivering a bag of social proof, then they track the conversions.

It works.

The real game is delivering so far above expectations that your customer feels morally obliged to evangelise. ‘Reciprocity’ is a powerful psychological driver of human behaviour

Copy the strategy used by Joe Girard, legendary Chevrolet salesman, recognised as the seller of the most cars in a year, 1,425 in 1975. No digital gimmicks, just relentless service, the belief that every customer was special and deserved to be treated as such. For example, Joe sent hand written birthday greetings, suggested service times and ensured there was a booking made, organised loan cars, and generally created a huge well of ‘reciprocity obligations’ among his customers.

Drucker said marketing’s job is to “create a customer.” Joe went one better. He created customers who created customers for him.

That’s the LCV of a one-off sale: A loop where exemplary service fuels advocacy, which drives hot leads back into your funnel. It’s not a transaction. It is a tree that bears fruit that produces seeds, from which more trees grow, to produce more seeds, creating a marketing flywheel.

Track success over time by recognising that the sale does not end with the initial transaction. Delight customers, they become advocates, which creates new leads. Track those!

Forget loyalty schemes. Build apostles.

Brand loyalty is dead. Long live preference.

Brand loyalty is dead. Long live preference.

 

 

‘Loyalty’ means that a consumer has internalised the value promised.

The purchase becomes automatic.

This is different to habit, which is easily disrupted. Loyalty comes from the ‘gut’ and confirms there is no alternative.

The only choice for a loyal consumer is to go without if their store is out of stock, or go down the road to another retailer.

Marketers often (usually) mistake preference and habit for loyalty. Market research usually makes the same mistake, acting as confirmation to marketers.

I drink a fair bit of coffee, working from home, and doing the ‘thinking’ stuff in the morning. To feed the habit, I buy a particular brand of coffee beans, almost always when it is on special. I also tend to ‘pantry-stock’.

The ‘normal’ shelf price is close to $40 a kilo. On special, it is usually $20 -$25.

Is my buying habit loyalty, or is it better described as regular or preferred?

If I was truly a loyal consumer, I would buy my preferred brand at ‘full’ price, but I never do.

On occasions when I have run out, I buy an alternative brand closer to the now benchmark price of $20. it is my opportunity to check out other brands, usually one I am in some way familiar with, that happens to be on special that week.

No loyalty shown there, only preference when the circumstances are right for me. Subject to the performance test of now and again, buying a competitor, I stick with my preferred brand, for now.